

VZCZCXYZ0004  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0170 0190817  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 190817Z JAN 07  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2430  
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0572  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/K AND ISN. PLEASE PASS TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY  
CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016

TAGS: [PARAM](#) [MTCR](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [KS](#) [PK](#)

SUBJECT: ROKG STILL PLANS TO ALLOW MACHINE TOOL EXPORT TO  
PAKISTAN

REF: A. SECSTATE 6640

[¶](#)B. SECSTATE 6636

[¶](#)C. SEOUL 4404

Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[¶](#)11. (U) This is an Action Request. Please see para 4.

[¶](#)12. (C) On January 19, poloff delivered reftel A points to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Deputy Kim Jae-woo. Kim informed poloff that the primary factor in the ROKG decision was the lack of concrete evidence of association between the United Engineering employees and Pakistan's Project Management Organization (PMO). Kim also shared that a ROK Embassy official had conducted a visit and site verification of United Engineering's office in Islamabad that had failed to produce any evidence that the machine tools would be diverted. Kim admitted that the ROKG could not say that this transaction posed no proliferation risks. However, he said that the Ministry of Commerce, Energy, and Industry (MOCIE), which is responsible for export licenses, required evidence that the shipment would be diverted and that all information provided to date was not sufficient to make that determination.

[¶](#)13. (C) Kim noted that there was still time to change the ROKG position since the shipment is scheduled to take place at the end of February. However, he stressed that revoking the export license would require definitive evidence that United Engineering and PMO are connected, such as a detailed list of the names and ranks of the employees and PMO individuals involved. Kim also said that the "easiest way" to block the export would be to include United Engineering on a U.S. proliferation watchlist, such as the Wisconsin Project watchlist. If this were to occur, Kim indicated that the ROKG would have a more substantive basis on which to revoke the export license.

[¶](#)14. (C) Action Request: Post requests that Department provide details about the link between United Engineering and PMO that can be shared with MOFAT. End Action Request.

STANTON